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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AKD RESPONDENTS 
NTATE1fENT OF FACTS 
This case i~ supple1nental to the case of Acott, et 
al r. Tomlinson, 9 Ftah 2d 71, 337 P. 2d 720, (here-
inafter referred to as "prior case"), and represents a 
snit by plaintiffs to enforce the judgment rendered in 
that action. The judgment in the prior case which was 
affirmed by this Court did four things: 
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2 
(1) It iinposed a trust upon an undivided 12/21sts 
of the interest in certain mining claims held by appellant; 
( 2) Awarded a money judg1nent to respondents 
against appellant mnounting to $24,525.07; 
( 3) Imposed a trust upon 12/21sts of a claim for 
certain 1nonies appellant had against Therald N. Jensen 
and Frank B. Hanson; and 
( 4) Imposed a trust upon 12/21sts of a clai1n which 
appellant had against Union Carbide Nuclear Company 
for royalties on ores produced by that Company under 
a lease of the mining properties. 
The judgment divested title to the property interest 
and funds from appellant, and vested the interest in 
respondents. (R. #7468, p. 96-7). 
The judgment did nothing as to the 9/21sts interest 
of record in appellant's name which represented a 2/2lsts 
interest appellant had acquired in his own right as an 
heir of his father and a 7 /21sts interest conveyed out-
right to appellant by his mother. (R. #7 468, p. 85, Finding 
31). At the trial of the prior suit on September 13, 
1955, Mrs. Lillie Tomlinson, appellant's mother, was 
called as a witness for appellant, and disclaimed any 
interest whatsoever to the property she had conveyed 
to appellant. (Case No. 7 468, Tr. 1: p. 186 lines 7-13; 
p. 197, lines 10-24; p. 199, lines 7-18; p. 203, lines 28-29; 
p. 204, lines 9-10). 
The present suit, as shown by the pleadings, repre-
sents an action by the respondents against Union Carbide 
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1\ ueh'ar Company to recover the 12/21sts of royalties 
then accrued which the prior case determined should 
be held in trust for respondents. (R. #8005, p. 1-4). 
In addition, the complaint sought a declaration of the 
plaintiffs' rights in and to future royalties. As the 
Third-Party complaint of Union Carbide Nuclear Corn-
puny shows, the suit was necessitated by a letter to 
that C01npany from appellant's attorney, despite the 
judgment in the previous suit, advising Union Carbide 
that any n1onies ·would be paid to respondents at the 
Company's jeopardy. (R. #8005, p. 10-12). Feeling in-
secure in n1aking any payn1ents to respondents, Union 
Carbide would not pay the money over without a judg-
ment against the1n. The ans\ver of Union Carbide 
Nuclear Company alleged that it ·was ready to make 
pay1nent of the royalties then on hand and which would 
accrue in the future· and would abide by any Order 
of the Court as to the disposition of these royalties. 
l Tnion Carbide brought appellant into the suit ( desig-
nating him as a third-party defendant although he should 
properly have been a defendant in an interpleader 
action) in order that any rights which he 1night have 
could be ascertained in the suit and Union Carbide 
1\uclear Cmnpany would be protected. (R. #8005, p. 
10~19). Appellant thereupon filed an ansvi'er and counter-
claim to the third-party complaint alleging, despite the 
drcree to the contrary in the prior suit, that he was 
the owner of the entire interest in the mining claims 
and entitled to receive all of the monies held b~· Union 
( ~arhide ~uclear C01npany. (R. #8005, p. 26) 
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Between the time this action was coininenced and 
the time that appellant filed his answer and counter-
claim, a writ of execution had been issued in the prior 
suit directing the Sheriff to levy upon the property of 
appellant in satisfaction of the Inoney judgment. (R. 
#7 468 -2, p. 3±) On 11ay 1, 1958 the Sheriff of Emery 
County sold at public auction "the interest of Leslie 
A. Tomlinson" in the mining claims above referred to, 
and at this sale plaintiffs purchased this interest. (R. 
#8005, p. 28). 
By his counterclaim, appellant set out allegations 
respecting the aforesaid Sheriff's Sale and alleged that 
because respondents and appellant were brothers and 
sisters the sale was void. (R. #8005, p. 26). No allegations 
were made respecting the price paid for the property 
interest, nor any unfair circumstances attending the sale. 
He alleged further that Union Carbide Nuclear Company 
was the Lessee of appellant and that Company owed a 
duty to appellant to protect appellant's interest in the 
mining claims against the Sheriff's Sale. He alleged 
a breach of this duty by Union Carbide Nuclear Com-
pany in permitting the Sheriff's Sale to take place and 
claimed damages aaginst Union Carbide Nuclear Com-
pany for the reasonable value of appellant's interest 
in the properties. (R. #8005, p. 27) Respondents filed a 
Reply to the counterclaim setting up the defense of res 
adjudicata and the defense that the Sheriff's Sale can-
not be collaterally attacked. (R. #8005, p. 31) 
Appellant knew of the Sheriff's Sale before it took 
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plaeP, inasn1uch as he attended the sale in person and 
served upon respondents a l\lotion requesting the recall 
of the \Yrit of Ext>cution and a temporary restraining 
order against the Sheriff's selling the properties upon 
the execution. Apparently appellant abandoned this 
motion in that it does not appear as having been filed 
with the Court, and no further action was taken b~· 
appellant before the Sheriff's Sale was held. 
No proceedings have been commenced in Civil No. 
7 4G8 to set aside the Sheriff's Sale of the 1nining prop-
erties as hereinabove set out, nor has any claim adverse 
to respondents been asserted to any interest in the 
mining properties or the funds involved in this suit 
by an~· one other than appellant. 
Respondents thereupon filed a l\1otion for Sum1nary 
Judgment based upon the files of the Court in the 
pending action and the files of the Court in the prior 
action. This motion was originally heard by the Court 
on June 30, 1958 and was denied without prejudice to 
respondents' rene-wal thereof. Respondents thereupon 
renewed the motion for summary judgment which was 
heard October :27, 1958 pursuant to notice thereof served 
upon each of the parties. No one appeared for either 
defendant or appellant at the hearing of that motion, 
(R. #8005, p. 43) and the Court granted plaintiffs' Motiort 
for Sun1n1ary Judgment. 
In connection with the October 27, 1958 Motion for 
Sum1nary Judgment, although Union Carbide Nuclear 
Cmnpany did not appear to argue the 1notion, on October 
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:2-1, 1958 the attorney for Vnion Carbide Nuclear Com-
pany sent a letter to Judge Keller respecting the motion 
wherein he verified the amounts of royalty accrued by 
Union Carbide Nuclear Company as alleged in the affi-
davit of Thomas C. Cuthbert attached to the ~lotion for 
Summary Judgment. 
rl,he Judgment was entered by the Court on October 
31, 1958. As outlined in respondents' Memorandum of 
Authorities filed with this Court in connection with 
respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal, eleven 
days after the entry of judgment, on November 11, 
1958, appellant served by mail a pleading designated 
Motion to Vacate Judgment. This 1notion was heard 
June 29, 1959. At the hearing of this motion, the Court 
on its own motion directed certain minor amendments 
to be made in the judgment, and the Amended Judgment 
was entered July 7, 1959, (R. #8005, p. 48) and a Notice 
of Appeal was filed by appellant on August 4, 1959. 
( R. #8005, p. 50). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDI·CTION TO REVIEW 
ANY MATTERS CONTAINED IN THE JUDGMENT OF 
OCTOBER 31, 1958 IN THAT NO APPEAL WAS TIMELY 
TAKEN. 
POINT II. 
EXTENT OF REVIEW IS LIMITED TO CONSIDERING 
ERROR IN DENYING MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT, 
OR IN MAKING AMENDMENT. 
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POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO VACATE NOR IN THE COURT'S AMENDMENT 
OF THE JUDGMENT. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ENTERING 




THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDI·CTION TO REVIEW 
ANY MATTERS CONTAINED IN THE JUDGMENT OF 
OCTOBER 31, 1958 IN THAT NO APPEAL WAS 'TIMELY 
TAKEN. 
':l_lhe J udgu1ent of October 31, 1958 was the final 
judgment frmn '"hich a ti1nely appeal would have to be 
taken. A sin1ilar situation arose in IJ. B. 'l 1• Wissahickon .. 
(CA 2d, 1952) 200 F. 2d 93G. The district court had 
granted a 1notion for summary judgment against de-
fendants by a written opinion on April10, 1951. Approxi-
mately nine 1nonths later, on January 23, 1952, plaintiff 
had prepared judg~nents for the court's signature and 
noticed these up for settle1nent. Defendants presented 
motions to file supplemental answers and to reargue 
certain 1notions which had previously been denied. On 
February 1, 1952 the matters were heard, and defend-
ant's Inotions were denied and the court signed the 
order and judgn1ent prepared by plaintiff. Defendant~ 
appea~ed frmn these judgments. and rom plain of the 
~~rlier adverse rulings. 
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The court said, at page 938 : 
"We may first address ourselves to the ques-
tion whether or not the appeals taken on March 
31, 1952, were timely. They were of course within 
the proper time, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 73 (a), 
as appeals from the orders of February 1, 1952, 
but not from those of April 10, 1951. But the 
earlier orders were clearly the final judgments. 
No more explicit mandate for a plaintiff's judg-
ment than that granting a summary judgment 
in the amount claimed can be conceived; and no-
tation of the grant in the civil docket on that 
date became the judgment under the provisions of 
F.R. 59. * * * * Nor would the date be changed 
by forms of judgment later submitted by counsel, 
even if these are signed by the judge." 
Respondents' Memorandum of Authorities, in con-
nection with their motion to dismiss the appeal hereto-
fore filed and argued, contains most of the authorities 
and argument in connection with the point that a motion 
made under Rule 60 does not extend the time for appeal, 
and these authorities will not be repeated in this brief, 
since they are already before the Court. This Court 
has taken respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal 
under advisement pending consideration of the case on 
its merits. 
POINT II. 
EXTENT OF REVIEW IS LIMI'TED TO CONSIDERING 
ERROR IN DENYING MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT, 
OR IN MAKING AMENDMENT. 
On June 29, 1959, approximately nine 1nonths after 
entry of judgment, appellant's Motion to vacate the 
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Judgment wa~ heard and denied err. ~, Case #8005, p. 
:~). The ·Court then, on its own rnotion, arnended the 
judgment according to the statements made by the court 
in directing the arnendment. The Court apparently made 
the arnendrnent to clarify the fact that the court was 
not making a detern1ination as to the rights of any 
persons who were not parties to the suit. 
Unless appellant can show that the court cmnmitted 
prejudicial error in denying his motion to vacate the 
judgment, or, in n1aking the amendment which it did, 
then this Court rnust affirn1 the lower court. Any ques-
tion of errors committed by the court in entering its 
October 31, 1958 judgrnent are not subject to review 
on this appeal. 
Several cases have so limited the extent of review 
under the Federal Rules, which are practically identical 
with Utah Rules. 
In Saenz v. J(enedy, (CA 5th, 1950) 178 F. 2d 417, 
the district court had granted defendant's motion for 
summary judgrnent by docket entry on August 8, 1948. 
Formal judgrnents were entered in the nine cases during 
Septen1ber and October, the last being on October 13, 
1948. X o notices of appeal ·were filed within thirty days. 
:JI otions under Rule 60 (b) were filed in January 1949 
to have judgments vacated on the ground they were void 
and involved collusion between the trial court and plain-
tiffs. These rnotions were denied and notices of appeal 
wen~ filed within 30 days fron1 the denial. 
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The Appellate Court said, at page 419: 
•'Since the notices of appeal were filed within 
thirty days of the overruling of the motions to 
vacate final judgments for collusion and fraud 
on appeal thereunder would bring up to this 
Court for review only the propriety or impro-
priety - the correctness or the error - of the 
Court below in denying these motions to vacate. 
It would not bring up for review by this Court 
the final judgments entered in September, 1948.. 
From these final judgments no appeals were 
taken within thirty days and this Court, is, there-
fore, without jurisdiction to review same. The 
appeals in these causes frmn such final judgments 
1nust be dismissed." 
See also Tarkington v. U. S. Lines Company (C. 
A. 2, 1955) 222 Fed. 2d 358: 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 
pp. 341-2; pp. 331-2, Sections 60.30(3); 60.27. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO VACATE NOR IN THE COURT'S AMENDMENT 
OF THE JUDGMENT. 
In his brief, appellant 1nakes no contention of error 
with respect to either of the points which is properly 
reviewable by this court. However, respondents will 
discuss them to show the correctness of the trial court's 
denial of appellant's motion to vacate the judgment 
and the immaterial effect of the amendment which it 
made to the judgment. 
Considering first the denial of appellant's motion 
to vacate the judgment, that motion alleged that the 
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jndgment was void; that the pleadings presented ma-
u~rial issues of fact, and that respondents' 1notion had 
been supported by affidavits based upon information 
and belief rather than on personal knowledge. 
'The only possible basis for relief frorn the judgment 
1s under Rule 60(b). Exa1nination of Rule 60(b) in 
the light of appellant's rnotion discloses that of these 
grounds only the contention that the judgment was void 
comes within the purview of that rule. The other grounds 
stated, if true, would only constitute error at law, and 
this is not a ground for relief under Rule 60(b). As 
to whether or not the judgment is void, the record dis-
doses that the court had personal jurisdiction over all 
parties to the suit, and that they appeared and pleaded. 
The trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
The court having jurisdiction of the parties and the 
subject matter, the judgment was not void, no matter 
how erroneous it might have been. 7 Moore's Federal 
Practice, p. 259, Sec. 60.25(2). Therefore, the trial court 
had no alternative but to deny the rnotion to vacate 
the judgment, which it properly did. 
Looking next at the amendment which the court 
made after denying appellant's motion, it is seen that 
this was rnade by the court on its own motion. Rule 
60 provides two types of relief from judgments. Rule 
60(a) deals with a court by motion or on its own 
initiative correcting clerical mistakes and errors in 
judgments arising from oversight or omission. Rule 
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GO(b) relates to relief from judgn1ents for certain ~PP~·i­
fied grounds on motion of a party. 
The trial court probably felt it was correcting an 
error arising frmn oversight or omission when it ordered 
the amendment, and hence would have been proceeding 
under Rule 60(a). On the other hand it may have con-
cluded the amendment was responsive to appellant's 
arguments on his 1notion, and therefore ordered the 
amendment as correcting a mistake, within the purview 
of Rule 60(b) (1), although this ground was not set out 
in appellant's motion to vacate. 
Although respondents believe the mnend1nent should 
not have been made, they believe the mnendment comes 
within the provisions of Rule 61, as being harmless 
error which does not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties. Since the purport of the amendment "'as to 
clarify that the court was not deternuning the rights 
of any persons not parties to the suit, the mnendment 
did nothing to the judgment which would not have been 
done as a matter of general law. The doctrine of res 
adjudicata is clearly limited to parties to suits or their 
privies, and for this reason, the judg1nent could not ]wye 
any effect upon persons not parties to the suit. 
That the effect of the muendn1ent does not prejudice 
appellant in any way is de1nonstrated by the statement 
contained in his brief at page 7, where he says. "The 
mnended judgment acrmnplishes the smne result [a~ 
the first jndgnwnt]." 
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For the foregoing reasons, respondents believe that, 
in:-;ofar as the only issues properly before this Court 
are concerned, there has been no prejudicial error com-
mitted which would justify a reversal of the trial 
;·onrt 's actions. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ENTERING 
JUDGMENT ON RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Respondents believe that the foregoing portions of 
this brief have completely disposed of the matters which 
8hould properly be considered by this Court. However, 
because appellant has devoted his entire brief to matters 
which he contends were errors committed by the trial 
court when it granted respondents' motion for summary 
judgrnent on October 31, 1958, and in order to dispel 
any doubts which the Court might have that by affirming 
the trial court's rulings it might become an indirect 
party to a grave injustice, consideration will be given 
to those aspects of the case which were decided by the 
Judgment of October 31, 1958. 
Even assurning appellant had made a timely appeal 
from the October 31, 1958 judgn1ent, this Court would not 
be justified in reversing the trial court's action. As stated 
above, appellant was served with notice of the hearing 
of respondent's motion for summary judgment, and was 
thereby given an opportunity to appear and present the 
arguments which he now advances as error of the trial 
court. He did not avail himself of this opportunity, and 
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permitted the judgment to be entered without his appear-
ance. For this reason he may not be heard to complain 
of errors allegedly committed by the trial court in hi~ 
absence. 
It is well settled that the scope of review on appeal 
from a default judgment is very limited. 5 C.J.S. p. 711, 
Appeal & Error, Sec. 1467. It is held that such revie\r 
is limited to an exam~nation of the pleadings, and that 
questions as to the sufficiency of evidence upon which 
the judgment was based is not open to review, People 
v. Taliaferro, 149 C.A. 2d 822, 309 P. 2d 48; and that an 
appeal will not lie frmn a default judgn1ent '"hich is 
1nerely voidable or erroneous, Pacific Savings an.a, Loa11 
v. Bekins, 146 Ore. 385, 29 P. 2d 816. 
It is sub1nitted that the trial court cmn1nitted no error 
in entering the sumn1ary judgment of October 31, 1958. 
This judg1nent is the only result which properly can lw 
reached if one puts hi:mself in the role of the trial co1irt 
and exmnines the pleadings and n1aterials it had beforr 
it in ruling on respondents' n1otion for summary judg-
n1ent. 
The trial court had before it the cmnplaint, answer 
and third party complaint of Union Carbide Nuclear 
Co., appellant's answer and counterclaini., the n1otion for 
stunmary judg1nent and the files and records of· tlw 
prior action. · 
Consideration of the correctness of the trial court'~ 
'•,. \'. . . 
ruling hreak~ dmn1 into the following; facets: (l) lssnr~ 
' .',• • • 1 •• ' • • • 
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between re:-;pondents and Union Carbide; (2) Issues 
between respondents and appellant as to accrued royal-
tip:-;; (3) Issues between respondents and appellant 
as to futnre royalties, and ( 4) Issues between appellant 
and Union Carbide as raised by appellant's Counterclaim. 
These matters will be discussed in that order. 
(1) As between respondents and Union Carbide, 
the only genuine issue raised by the pleadings was a ques-
tion of what 1nining claims respondents had acquired 
an interest in frmn the prior suit. Union Carbide claimed 
it owned the Temple mining claims, except for the por-
tions passing to respondent's and their co-owners by a 
lease of May 1950. In the motion for summary judgment, 
respondents acknowledged this and claimed only an inter-
est in the royalties accruing under that lease. This elimi-
nated the only material issue between respondents and 
Fnion Carbide. Its counsel thereupon advised the court 
he would not appear to resist the motion and verified 
the amounts of royalties accrued under the lease up to 
the time of the motion. These amounts were exactly 
the smne as set forth in the affidavit attached to respond-
ent's motion and the amounts on which judgment was 
entered. These became the first two items of the Octo-
ber 31, 1958 judgment. 
It is noteworthy that Union Carbide, the judgment 
debtor has not appealed, indicating the correctness of 
the lack of issues between respondents and that company. 
(2) As to issues between appellant and respond-
ents, these are best broken down into two categories, 
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namely, as to royalties already accrued and as to the 
future rights to royalties. By appellant's ans·wer it i~ 
seen that he \vas clai1ning the entire interest in the royal-
ty income for hiinself. This had been the question re-
solved by the prior action in which the court established 
a 12/21sts interest in this royalty income in respondent~, 
and appellant \Vas left with 9/21sts interest. That judg-
Inent in Civil No. 7 468 was res adjudicata of the rights 
of the parties until their rights changed by virtue of the 
Sheriff's execution sale. Royalties accrued up to that 
time were divided in the judgn1ent ·with respondents ob-
taining judgn1ent for only 12/21sts thereof. Appellant 
cannot contend for anything contrary to this. 
(3) By their con1plaint respondents asked for a 
determination of their rights to future royalties under 
the lease. At the time the complaint was filed, any deter-
mination would have required a ruling that respondents 
were entitled to a 12/21sts interest in the Tomlinson 
portion of those royalties. This would have been in 
keeping with the judgment of the prior action. Hmvever, 
by his answer to the third party cmnplaint and counter-
claim, appellant brought before the Court the fact that 
a Sheriff's sale had been had pursuant to a writ of exe-
eution at which respondent's had purchased all of the 
re1naining interest appellant had in the property. A copy 
of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was attached to Ap-
pellant's pleading. :B.,rmn this the 1natter of respondents' 
interest acquired by the :May 1, 1958 execution sale came 
into the suit. 
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In connection with appellant's answer, he had alleged 
the ~heriff's sale was void. To support this he alleges 
only that respondents were the brother and sisters of 
appellant and that because of this relationship the sher-
iff's sale on writ of execution is void. (R. 8005, page 26.) 
B)· his pleadings he 1nakes no contention that the price 
paid was inadequate or that there was any unfairness 
in the conduct of the sale. These latter contentions first 
appear in appellant's brief. 
The nwtion for summary judgment therefore necessi-
tated an examination of whether or not there was any 
genuine issue of any material fact concerning the Sher-
iff's sale and if not what interest respondents acquired 
thereby as a matter of law. 
As to the facts concerning the Sheriff's sale there 
was no dispute: Respondents had purchased all the re-
maining interest of appellant at a sheriff's sale on a writ 
of execution and had paid $3,000.00 for that interest. All 
of the records relating to that sale are a part of the record 
of Civil No. 7 468, which was before the court on the mo-
tion. 
In this state of the pleadings, as a matter of law 
the ·Court had to reject the contention that a person may 
not levy execution upon the property of his brother 
against whom he has a judgment. Facing an allegation 
that the sale was void, it would then be incumbent upon 
the Court to examine the proceedings of the sale to see 
if there was anything about the sale which made it void 
on its face. There being nothing of this nature, the Court 
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could not do otherwise than rely upon the validity of thr 
sheriff's sale, which it did. 
The next question to be resolved by the trial court 
after determining the validity of the sheriff's sale was th(J 
extent of the interest respondents had in future royaltie;.;. 
By the prior action, respondent's had obtained tlw 
12/21sts interest in the 3.7158% royalty interest. By th•! 
sheriff's sale, respondents acquired all the remaining 
interest that appellant had. 
The files and records of Civil No. 7 -!68 show that 
at the time of c01nmencement of the prior action, appel-
lant had the legal title to the entire interest to the prop-
erty, subject only to the possible equitable interests of 
respondents and Mrs. Lillie M. Tomlinson, the mother 
of the parties. These possible equities ·w·ould arise only 
by reason of the understanding and agreements of the 
parties at the tilne the legal title was conveyed by rr-
spondents and their mother to appellant. The determina-
tion of those equities was the precise question involved 
in the prior suit. 
In the trial of that suit, l\Irs. Lillie l\1. Ton1linson 
testified as a witness and disclaimed any interest in thr 
property she had conveyed to appellant. (Tr. 1, No. 7468, 
pp. 186, 197, 199, 203, 204). It therefore bec01nes appar-
ent that at the conclusion of the prior suit, appellant wa-.: 
,left with 9/:2lsts interest, and by reason of l\Irs. Lillir 
T01nlinson's disclailner by her testiinony there is no 
.q-uestion that he held the entire· beneficial interest in 
that 9/21~~t intere~t. 'l1he f:heriff's deed therefor~ rC'~nlterl 
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in a eonveyance of a 9/:21st interest to respondents, and 
respondents thereupon became the owners of the entire 
:1.7158% interest in the 1nining properties and were such 
at the time of the 1notion for summary judgn1ent. 
Although it goes without saying that the only persons 
bound by the judg1nent are those who are parties to the 
:5uit or their privies, the trial court felt constrained to 
amend the judgment in this respect in order that no ques-
tion of res adjudicata Inight be raised if Lillie M. Tom-
linson should in the future attempt to assert an equitable 
interest in the property in a later action she might bring 
against respondents. As to this point, however, see 
Fa1tlkner v. DooZy, 28 U. 236, 78 P. 365; Wood v. Fox, 
Whitney v. Fox, 8 U. 380, 32 P. 48, aff'd. 66 U.S. 648, 41 
L. Ed. 1149, for cases holding that even apart from her 
disclaimer she would be barred from asserting any inter-
est at this tin1e because of laches and the statute of limit-
ations. Regardless of the outcome of any such possible 
later action by the mother, legal title to the entire interest 
is in respondents by virtue of the judgment in the prior 
action and the Sheriff's sale. 
( 4) There remains only to consider appellant's 
counterclaim against Union Carbide. The allegations of 
the counterclaim are that Union Carbide was the lessee 
of the mining properties involved in the suit and that by 
reason thereof it owed a duty to protect appellant's inter-
est from the Sheriff's sale under writ of execution. (R. 
8005, p. 27) There is no allegation of any duty except 
as arises from Union Carbide's leasing the premises. 
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These leases between appellant and Union Carbide are 
part of the record (R. 2, No. 7468, pp. 10-3G), and they 
show there was no duty imposed on the lessee such a~ 
contended. Appellant was aware of the forthcoming 
sheriff's sale, having served a motion to recall the "-rit 
of execution and for a temporary restraining order 
against the sheriff's conducting the sale. Having knmYn 
of the sale and having attended it in person, he was fully 
capable of protecting any rights he had in the property. 
Conceding all of the facts alleged in appellant's 
counterclaim as true, the proposition then becomes one of 
law of whether or not a lessee, merely by reason of his 
status as such, o·wes a duty to his lessor to prevent r:t 
sheriff's sale of the property pursuant to a writ of execu-
tion where the lessor knows of the sale himself. There 
can be no such recovery on facts such as those alleged as 
a matter of law. 
From the foregoing, it is seen that there was no genu-
ine issue of any 1naterial fact for the court to resolve by 
trial, and that the court as a n1atter of law was correct 
in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
Two other n1atters raised by appellant in his brief 
should be briefl~~ n1entioned. First, appellant contends 
the affidavit of Thmnas (\ Cuthbert was based on infor-
mation and belief and the granting of a judgn1ent based 
upon this constitutes reversible error. Apart frmn rnion 
Carbide'~ rounsel's Yerif:dng these figures to the rourt. 
exmnination of the affidavit shows a staten1ent of an 
admission against interest n1ade by rounsel for rnion 
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Carbide. This statmnent is not based upon infonnation 
and hPliPI', and is competent evidence of the facts stated 
then·in. The affiant states that based upon the admission 
against intPrest as to the fact, he believes the truth of 
the mnounts of accrued royalty set out in the affidavit. 
It is further submitted that appellant is not prejudiced 
in any way hy the affidavit, since it goes to the amount 
to be paid out by Union Carbide, which has not appealed 
from the judgment against it. 
X ext, appellant argues that respondents did not give 
him an opportunity to object to the form of the amended 
judgment before it was entered. Examination of the 
transcript of proceedings reveals that the Court directed 
respondents' counsel to prepare an amended judgment 
and file it. If appellant desired to object, he would have 
an opportunity to do so by a motion to strike. A copy 
of the amended judgment was mailed to appellant on 
July 7, 1959, the date it was entered, and he made no 
motion respecting that judgment as the Court had pro-
posed. For this reason he cannot contend he was preju-
diced in any way by this procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that this Court 
must dismiss the appeal now before it on the following 
grounds: It has no jurisdiction to decide any of the 
issues raised by appellant's brief. The judgment of 
October 31, 1958 now complained of by the appellant be-
came final and no appeal was taken within the time pre-
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scribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial 
court committed no error in the entry of that judgment 
and the same was proper. If there was any error com-
Initted by the Court, it was in amending the judgment on 
July 7, 1959, when it had no jurisdiction to make an 
amendment for other than an error of omission. Such 
amendment, since it merely eliminates any effect the 
prior judgrnent might have had on persons not partie~ 
to the suit, is not prejudicial to the rights of any of the 
parties and is therefore harmless error. The errors com-
plained of by appellant, if they were in fact errors, con-
stituted harn1less errors which must be disregarded. It 
is noteworthy that this litigation and its antecedent have 
been in the courts for over five years, and have involved 
expenditures of tirne and n1oney disproportionate to 
the amounts in controversy. Respondents respectfully 
urge that this Court should endeavor to bring: thi~ liti-
gation to a close without further controversy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHENS, BRAYTOX &. 
LO\VE and 
THO~IAS C. CFTHBERT. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respon.denfs 
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